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Phenomenological Insights into Oppression: Passive
Synthesis and Personal Responsibility
Neal De Roo

Dordt College
Drawing on phenomenology’s account of “passive synthesis,” this paper seeks to provide a
phenomenological vocabulary that could be useful in explaining institutional oppression to those
who find it difficult to understand that we can be responsible for acts and meanings that we do
not intend. Though the main goal of the paper is to justify the use of the terminology of passive
synthesis in the discourse on oppression, the paper ends by suggesting how employing passive
synthesis in this manner suggests ways of combating oppression.

The idea of responsibility for that which is not intended is key
to any structural or institutional understanding of oppression.1 Such
an understanding of oppression claims that one can never understand
oppression if “one’s focus is riveted upon the individual event in all its
particularity, including the particularity of the individual man’s present
conscious intentions and motives and the individual woman’s conscious
perception of the event in the moment” (Frye 2003, 186). Truly making
sense of oppression requires a “shift [in] the level of one’s perception in
order to see the whole picture” of societal oppression (Frye 2003, 186).
However, such a shift in the level of perception to societal macrostructures often proves problematic to those who cannot conceive that they
could be held responsible by others for things that they do not intend.
The idea that I could be responsible for things I do not actively intend
to do, therefore, proves to be a main point of resistance, both to the
structural notion of oppression itself (when people refuse to shift the level
of perception beyond the individual), and to the idea that people have a
personal responsibility for oppressive structures. In both instances, people
are unable to move beyond the idea that my intentions govern my actions
and, especially, my moral and ethical responsibility for those actions. If I
can be held responsible only for those actions that I freely undertake, and I
freely undertake an action only when I do so knowingly and willingly, then,
even if I can acknowledge that “society” seems to work against particular
oppressed groups (a rather large “if,” given this assumption concerning
personal responsibility), I will fail to see my personal responsibility
for that oppression, since I would never knowingly and willingly do
sexist, or otherwise oppressive, things. That is, while some people may
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acknowledge that “society” is oppressive, they cannot acknowledge that
they in any way contribute to this oppression.2 Without being aware
of their personal responsibility for the situation, it is next to impossible
to motivate people who assume such an individual and voluntaristic
account of the (ethical and moral) subject to change oppressive structures.
Challenging the deeply held conviction that I cannot be held
responsible for things I do not intend is important, then, to the fight
against oppression. It has also proven, at least in my experience, to
be immensely difficult. To begin immediately talking about societal
structures is off-putting to those who cling to a more individualistic
viewpoint, but not talking about societal structures at all makes discussing
structural oppression impossible. What is needed is a vocabulary that can
discuss structural notions of oppression in a way that is both adequate
to challenge people to see their personal responsibility for the situation,
and yet familiar enough that they will not be predisposed, from the
beginning, to discount the very idea of a structural account of oppression.3
It is in beginning to develop such a vocabulary that I propose to
show that the phenomenological notion of passive synthesis has something
worthwhile to offer to discussions of oppression. While one does have to
“shift the level of one’s perception in order to see the whole picture” of
oppression, phenomenology suggests that that shift does not only have to be
from a focus on the individual to a focus on societal structures, but also from
a focus on the individual as an acting agent to a focus on the individual as
necessarily acted upon by societal forces. By showing how every individual
makes sense4 of the world, phenomenology can help explain how societal
structures operate within and upon individuals in a way that is both
beyond their control and yet for which they remain personally responsible.
Central to this explanation is the idea of “passive synthesis” and the
integral role it plays in how we make sense of the world in which we live.
Because passive synthesis is something that is simultaneously accomplished
by the subject (which thereby makes it responsible for the results of
passive synthesis) and done without the active consent of the ego (thereby
explaining how we can do things without intending to do them, and even,
at times, do things that run counter to our intentions), it clarifies how
we can participate unintentionally in institutions (or actions, meanings,
etc.) without thereby removing the burden of responsibility from ourselves
for that participation. The paper ends by suggesting how this recourse to
passive synthesis might also help us begin to change our unintentional acts,
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and so further contribute to the fight against oppression.
Passive Synthesis and the Constitution of the World
In Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl5
claims that the “fundamental stratification” of consciousness is its split
into passive and active levels (Husserl 1973, 64). The realm of passivity
describes those acts that occur within the subject without the ego acting
on them, that is, without consciously taking them up. This is in contrast
to the realm of activity, in which the subject knowingly directs its egoic
regard to a particular object or purposively intends a particular act.
The essential elements of passive constitution6 are associative
structure, affection, and attention (Husserl 1985, §§ 16-18).7 Attention is
a “tending of the ego toward an intentional object, toward a unity which
‘appears’ continually in the change of the modes of its givenness” (Husserl
1985, 85). This tending occurs because of affecting [Affektion], that is,
“the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the
ego” (Husserl 1973, 148), though this pull is different from, and in a sense
prior to, the ego’s attentively turning toward an object. Just as the heat
of a fire is a stimulus that prompts us to remove our hand automatically,
reflexively, and without the active involvement of the ego, so the allure of
an object stimulates the ego to constitute (i.e., make sense of ) that object
automatically, like a reflex, before the active involvement of the ego.8
But the very process of constituting objects in the world is therefore
already discretionary: by exercising an alluring pull on our consciousness,
the object not only causes us to take it up (that is, it rather than something
else), it also causes us to take it up in a certain way (that is, we take X up
as X, not as Y or Z or A). When I encounter a chair, for example, the chair
stimulates me to constitute it as a chair, rather than as a (rather small) house
or a (particularly unattractive and sedentary) person or anything else. It
does this without the need of my conscious ego intervening to determine
what this thing before me is—I just automatically make sense of it as a
chair and sit in it, without thinking about what I’m doing.9 This ability
to constitute the chair as a chair results from association, conceived as a
“purely immanent connection of ‘this recalls that,’ ‘one calls attention to the
other’” (Husserl 1985, 78). This recalling is done on the basis of similarity:
that which is reproduced from the past is like that which is perceived in
the present, in some way. This affective similarity entails that, at least at
this stage of constitution, the affection is felt rather than understood, and
is experienced as tendency: this affective pull tends to recall that previously
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experienced affective pull; also, that previously experienced affective
pull tends to produce a certain set of characteristics or consequences; the
similarity between present affective pulls and relevantly similar, previously
experienced affective pulls tends to produce similar characteristics in the
present as were experienced in the past, and so on. The result of this
concordance is what we commonly refer to as a tendency. The chair in front
of me affects me in a way that recalls earlier experiences when I have been
similarly affected. These earlier experiences, in turn, share some common
characteristics that I then infer10 will apply also to the situation before
me: in the earlier experiences, the chair had a solid back, was able to hold
weight, etc., and so I infer that this thing in front of me now in the present
will also have these characteristics. This, in turn, enables me to expect,
with varying degrees of certainty, how the other sides of the chair could be
perceived if I were to make those other sides available to me, for example
by walking around so that I could see the back of chair directly. That is,
because of the tendencies produced in association, I am able to expect other,
currently non-present sides of the chair, which allows me to apperceive—
and hence perceive—what I see as a chair, a thing like other chairs.
More importantly, from an experiential standpoint, these tendencies
enable me to expect certain behavioral characteristics of the chair (e.g., that
it will hold my weight, that it is an acceptable thing to sit on) that enable
me to interact with the chair in a meaning-full—but still automatic—way.
I do not think (at least, not consciously) before I sit in a chair, but this
does not mean my sitting in the chair is a meaningless act. That I sit in
the chair (rather than trying to live in it, talk with it, or something else)
evidences that I have constituted it—made sense of it—in a particular way.
But it must be emphasized again that all of this happens passively,
that is to say, automatically. The associative aspects of passive synthesis
are not separate moments that follow each other, as if I first perceived A,
then related it to B, then remembered what B was like and inferred that
A, too, must be similar. Rather, this all happens inherently in the very act
of perception itself: I do not first encounter the world, and then relate it
to previous experiences; rather, I encounter the world primarily in and
out of my horizon of past experiences. Phrased alternatively, meaning is
not added to the world after the fact, but rather the world I encounter is
always a meaningful world. In Husserl, this notion begins to emerge with
his discussion of the “object-like formations” [Gegenständlichkeit] that are
constituted in passive synthesis. These are what enable us to interact with
things in the world without first running those interactions through our
active judgments.11 We need not experiment or consciously think about
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whether some object is or is not a chair—rather, we come in and sit on
it, without interrupting our conversation. In making us able to do this,
passive synthesis not only gives us the seeds for further judgments, but,
more importantly, it gives us an “environing world”12 that makes sense, in
which we live and by which we are affected.
Passivity and the Acts of the Subject
The notion of passive synthesis, in addition to being critical to
how we make sense of the world, opens up the possibility of simultaneous
responsibility and passivity, that is, of being responsible for things we do
not actively intend. Levinas takes this up explicitly in his re-reading of
Husserl. Levinas notes that the idea of passivity necessarily entails that the
subject is not alone and monadic, but is always influenced by a world that
“is not only constituted but also constituting” (Levinas 1998a, 118). This
is to say that the world is not only constituted by the subject, but also helps
to constitute that subject. As subjects, we not only act upon the world, but
are acted upon by that world.
By showing that the ego is not purely active, but is also passive
(and passively active and actively passive), Levinas’ conception of
phenomenology paves the way for a re-evaluation of the freedom of the
(moral) subject. Instead of being free first, and responsible only because it
is free (to make choices, to have done otherwise, etc.), Levinas asserts that
the subject is first responsible, and is free (to act, to make choices and do
things) only because it is responsible (to an interpersonal world that is
meaningful because of other, meaning-granting people within it). The ego
is not wholly free to do as it wishes, but is rather primordially constituted
by something (and someone) outside of itself. This means, most basically,
that the very power and basic functioning of the subject—the subject’s
ability to constitute the world—is not something that the subject does on
its own merit or because of its own inherent capacities. Rather, the subject
is able to do what it does only because it has had those abilities bestowed
upon it by another (or by multiple Others13). In this sense, the most basic
action of the self—its ability to make sense of the world—is not the
outworking of its own sovereignty, but is in fact the product of the self ’s
relationship with the Other (and with others).14 The self is not first on the
scene, but rather the last. The self decides whether or not to be in relation
with others only after it has been given the ability to decide by its relation
to others. The self makes sense of the world only after other people in that
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world—both individually and collectively—give the subject the ability to
make sense. Levinas’ entire discourse of the ipseity of the subject as
responsibility15 is the radicalization of this point.16
Think, for example, of yourself as a person who is able to make
sense of the world, someone who can encounter objects in meaningful
ways and interact with them accordingly. You have the ability to go against
societal conventions, if you choose, or to go along with societal
conventions—but both options presuppose a familiarity with those societal
conventions, a familiarity that cannot be learned auto-didactically, but
must be taught. You can teach yourself something (e.g., a new language)
only because you have first learned at the knee of others. You can make
sense of the world only because you have first learned, from others, how to
make sense—how to use and apply concepts, how to interact with other
people (socially, linguistically, economically, etc.), and so on. Further, you
are able to do that only because someone else first kept you alive by feeding
you, clothing you, protecting you. And many of the ways in which you
now make sense of the world reflect, either positively or negatively, the
ways in which those who raised you taught you (implicitly and otherwise)
to make sense of the world. Without first yourself being given the ability to
make sense, you would now be totally unable to make sense of the world.
In making sense of the world, then, you act automatically (as
discussed earlier), but in these very automatic actions you already reveal a
certain relationship to those who helped give you the ability to make sense.
Building on this point, we see a compelling reason for our responsibility
for social institutions: because it is always already engaged in a world that
it both constitutes and is constituted by, the subject is always “on the hook”
for this world and for its response to that world. If we cannot control the
aspects of society that shape and constitute us originally—if we are, in
Levinas’ language, primordially constituted by something outside
ourselves—it is also true that we are not merely receivers of social pressures,
but are shapers and transmitters of society as well: we are not just
constituted, we are also constituting. As constituting, I (the subject) am
responsible, at least partially, not only for the way I myself make sense of
the world, but also for the meanings or sense of the world that I
communicate to others. Because my passive syntheses make sense of
current experiences in part by associating currently encountered things
with other similar experiences I have of things,17 my previous experiences
gain not only an epistemological significance (in terms of how they help
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me make sense of the world) but an ethical or moral significance as well:
they not only help me make sense of some encountered A, but they make
me encounter A precisely as (an) A—a chair as a chair, but also a man as a
man, a white person as a white person—and therefore subsume a unique
individual under categories that make sense of the individual thing by
relating it to other things. Because this relation to other things will then
shape how I understand and act toward A, the experiences which shape my
understanding of A as (an) A necessarily have a moral as well as an
epistemological content.
But this sense is not merely individual either. That is, the
experiences that help me make sense of A are not only my experiences, but
are shaped in large part by other people: the way other people have treated
me, both as an individual and as a type of something or an instance of
something (e.g., a male, a white person), what other people have taught
me, implicitly or explicitly, about how to think about or react to things,
and so on. In this sense, every subject is necessarily shaped by
intersubjective—indeed, by social—forces and institutions. But this is a
two-way street, as Levinas has explained to us: we are not only constituted
by others in the world, but we also constitute others in the world. That is
to say, my reactions to, experiences of, and actions toward things (and
people) in the world make up my “horizons,” the reservoir of past
experiences and affections used in every act of passive association. My
horizons, however, are not only used in my own future passive associations,
but are also partially constitutive of the horizons of other people’s future
passive associations. How I react to certain things in the world is observed
by other people, and goes into their “repository of experiences,” which in
turn will then shape how they experience, act toward and make sense of
those things in the future.
Though passive association happens automatically, it is still
something I do, and hence something for which I bear responsibility. In
fact, I can be seen as doubly responsible in my passive associations. First, I
am responsible, at least partially, for my own passive associations, since I
am the one drawing the similarities to previous experiences (even if I do so
automatically, that is, passively) and I am the one who had those previous
experiences to which I am now making the associations. I and no one else
perform my passive associations: I am affected by things in a certain way, I
relate these affections to previously experienced affections that I have had,
I am the one who had those previously experienced affections.18 Secondly,
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I am responsible for the way in which my actions and tendencies become
part of the experiences of other people and shape the way that they make
sense of the world. Whether I intend to or not, because I am not just
constituted by the world, but also serve to help constitute the world—
because I not only learn at the knee of others but others also learn at my
knee—I impact the way others experience and make sense of the world,
and as such I am responsible for what my actions and reactions communicate
to others about the world.19
The nature of the subject as both passive (in its reception of
external stimulus and external influence, including in the very formation
of that subject itself ) and active (even in the very world that in turn
constitutes the subject) therefore makes possible that the subject can be
responsible, even for things it may not (actively) intend. If passive
constitution is beyond our control, it is no less, for all that, something
committed by us, and hence something for which we bear responsibility.
Of course, it is not an act we commit “freely” in a modern sense of the term
(which presupposes uncoerced purposive consent), but this very notion of
freedom is itself challenged by the view of the self as constituted (rather
than purely constituting).20 Furthermore, as agents of (and not merely in)
society, we bear some responsibility for the actions of that society. This
preserves the possibility of social change that an overly passive view of the
subject-society relation might seem to challenge. This possibility of social
change seems necessary for any discourse on oppression.
Allow me to use an example to help illustrate how the recourse to
passive synthesis helps us make sense of oppression. I have a niece and a
nephew who are very close in age. Though I consider myself quite
committed to breaking down gender stereotypes, I found myself
nevertheless (and much to my horror) treating my niece and nephew in
markedly different ways. If he needed something, for example, I would
encourage my nephew to get it himself (“You can do it! Come on—just a
little farther, you’re almost there!”), while, if my niece needed something, I
would be far more likely to get it for her. In the big picture, this plays
directly into the hands of gender stereotyping, and the oppression of
women: by treating my nephew in this manner, I encourage him to be selfsufficient and capable, while my niece acquires a certain learned helplessness
that leaves her adept, perhaps, at manipulation, but ultimately dependent
on others. How could this be?
The problem does not stem from the fact that I want to encourage
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the oppression of women, either consciously or unconsciously. The
problem, therefore, is not that I see one as male, and then think “Oh, he
can do it himself,” while I see the other as a female and think “She’ll
probably need my help to do it.” Rather, in constituting them, preobjectively (that is, passively), I constitute one as male and one as female.
In this very constitution, I already smuggle in, so to speak, certain
presuppositions. Why? Because I encounter them always already as male or
female, and in so doing, I associate them with my varied experiences of
maleness and femaleness (i.e., with the sense I have of maleness and
femaleness),21 experiences that occurred in a world that treats (and acts
toward) maleness and femaleness in different ways. That is, in encountering
them as male (or female), I passively call to mind certain associations I have
with maleness and femaleness, associations based in part on previous
incidences (both theoretical and lived) in which I was affected by maleness
and femaleness. In these other experiences (including, of course, the
experience of how I was treated by others), I no doubt experienced males
as independent and doing things themselves, and females as more adept at
social interaction, using their words to get what they want. I had these
previous experiences, in part because the people whom I was experiencing
were themselves recalling their earlier experiences and affections, etc., back
into history, a history that is, in our part of the world, notably patriarchal;
and, in part because of my own experiences, also shaped by that history.
While consciously I am aware of this history of cultural and social
transmission, passively, that is to say, associatively, I make use of this history
without the intervention of acts of judgment and critique.
But my responsibility is not only for how I treat my nephew and
niece in light of my experiences and affections concerning maleness and
femaleness. It is also for the ways in which my current actions of treating
them differently in turn shapes, not only their experiences of maleness and
femaleness, but also the experiences of all those who see me act this way
(their parents and other friends and relatives who are around), and those
who are subsequently affected by those who see me act this way (those
who, in turn, encounter my nephew or niece, their parents, or the other
friends and relatives, and those who encounter those who encounter my
nephew or niece, their parents, and so on). That is, formative influence is
not only exercised from “the top down” (e.g., from adults to children), but
also between peers and from “the bottom up” (e.g., from children to
adults). Influence is caught up in a complex social web that is neither fully
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controllable nor unidirectional. Indeed, it is precisely the uncontrollable,
multi-directional aspect of influence that makes us so responsible in these
situations.
Passive synthesis, then, by way of affection and association, helps
us see how we continue to pass on and transmit socially learned behavior
without doing so intentionally.22 Further, because the associations made
are to my own past experiences, I am still responsible for the content of
those associations, even if, to some extent, I was not responsible for how
people treated me, and other aspects that went into making up my
experiences. If I am clearly responsible for my acts and active judgments
(i.e., those things I do purposively), then, given that my horizon of past
experiences and affections is itself made up (in part) of my past acts and my
judgments upon them, I would seem to be responsible also for my horizon
of past experiences and affections. In addition, the society that conditions,
not just myself but also those who act upon me, is itself the product of my
acts and judgments (though surely not mine alone), and I therefore bear
(some) responsibility for it as well. Though I do not intend my passive
syntheses and associations purposively, this does not absolve me of
responsibility for them.
Conclusion: Changing our Passive Syntheses
So far, I have tried to demonstrate that the language of passive
synthesis, drawn from phenomenology, can provide us with a vocabulary
with which to talk about the notion of unintended responsibility that is
central to most structural theories of oppression. Given its emphasis on
individual action and responsibility, this vocabulary, I hope, is familiar
enough that it would not immediately off-put those not already inclined to
agree with the viability of a structural understanding of society, while still
proving challenging enough to get them to see their personal responsibility
in and for oppressive structures. Specifically, I hope that the notion of
passive synthesis gives us an account of how we might be responsible for
things we do not intend (in the strong sense of purposive, freely chosen
action). In this regard, I hope the discussion of passive synthesis will be
helpful to those attempting to discuss issues of oppression either with those
who are not familiar with, or with those who are hostile to, structural
theories of oppression.
But I also hope that the vocabulary of passive synthesis can help
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shed light on oppression theory in a new and helpful way for those working
within the field. In this light, I would now like to briefly examine some
ways in which it is possible to change our passive syntheses and associations.
At first, the possibility of changing those actions that we do not intend to
do seems difficult, if not downright contradictory: because they do not
pass through our active judgments and decision-making faculties, we
cannot change our passive synthesis through a resolve of the will or through
a commitment to be more careful. However, the notion that our horizons
are determined by the “sedimentation” or “depositing” of experiences into
the reservoir of our previous experiences and affections outlines one way in
which we can begin to change our passive syntheses.
Because passive association requires a horizon of past experiences,
change is possible, if, perhaps, somewhat slow. Though we cannot go back
and change our past experiences, we can change aspects about this past:
first, we can change our emotional, intellectual, and affective reaction to
past experiences; second, we are always modifying the horizon of past
experiences by creating new past experiences, as the present continues to
slide into the past.
I will begin with the second of these. Our horizon of past
experiences results from the sedimentation of previous active and passive
acts of the ego. Hence, by changing how we think about and judge things
now, we can begin to offer new material for possible future associations
within the horizon of past experiences.
If association operated solely according to volume of reactions
(i.e., to what happened the most often in previous similar situations), then
adding new experiences to the reservoir of our past experiences would take
a great deal of time to make a difference in our passive syntheses. However,
association operates mainly by way of affection: it is how a thing affects me
that calls to mind similar, previous affections, not some inherent similarities
in the things themselves. Hence, if we can change the nature of the affection
of our previous experiences, we can help to ensure that situations will call
to mind more recent (and perhaps more favorable) experiences, rather than
others.
Modifying how we are affected by things (or modifying how we
were affected by things) is possible, though not easy. Because affection is
not the same thing as emotion, changing these affections is not equivalent
to changing how we “feel” about them. At the same time, changing how we
feel about things obviously changes the manner in which they affect us and
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the experiences they recall for us. For example, things that are strange to us
call to mind other things that are strange to us, most of which inspire
emotions of nervousness and anxiety in us. As such, encountering
something with which I am not very familiar—be it a food I have never
tried or a person from a racial group with which I do not have significant
previous experience—calls to mind, not only those experiences of other
things that are strange to us, but also experiences of other things that
inspire nervousness and anxiety in us. As such, my automatic response to
unfamiliar things will skew in the direction of anxiety, making me less
likely to have positive experiences of unfamiliar things.
To begin to change this response, I must first analyze the response,
and make myself aware of its constitutive parts, of what is being recalled in
these instances of passive synthesis. I can then make myself more familiar
with that particular food or with people of that racial group, so that my
further experiences of that food or of people of that racial group no longer
call to mind previous experiences of unfamiliar things, but rather previous
experiences of that food or racial group.
This would not, however, help me in future encounters with other
unfamiliar things. To begin to try to change that, I would have to try to
have more positive experiences of things that are unfamiliar to me, so that
I would begin to associate unfamiliar things with emotions of pleasant
surprise, even excitement, rather than nervousness and anxiety. Having
more positive experiences here requires not only doing things that are more
positive, but also responding more positively to the things that I do (and
have previously done). In other words, to have more positive associations
with unfamiliar food I need to not only eat more good-tasting food with
which I was previously unfamiliar, but I also need to bring to mind previous
incidences when trying unknown foods worked out well (the delicious pad
thai I had the first time I ate Thai food, or my discovery of strawberry
cheesecake flavored ice cream), rather than focusing on those times when
it did not (the smoke-flavored beer I tried that time in Paris, or the
bubblegum ice cream that was overly sweet). In doing this, I will not only
try to override my automatic responses by consciously pushing past them,
but I will also begin to change those automatic responses by instituting
new habits, which will in turn change how I feel about things I have
previously done.
Of course, my reaction of nervousness and anxiety to unfamiliar
things is not the result of my experiences alone, but also of the way in
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which societal views relating unfamiliarity to terror have been sedimented
in my horizon of past experiences. To begin to change my affection toward
unfamiliar things, then, I must not only alter the things I do in regard to
unfamiliar things, but also make myself aware of and alter the things I do
that make me more likely to take on certain societal views rather than
others (e.g., watching action movies or reading certain websites or news
sources that portray the unfamiliar as dangerous). This involves not just
changing how I think about things, but changing my actions—especially
my habitual actions—to alter my affections. In this regard, I must make
myself a more conscientious consumer of social and cultural mores.
So far, what I have suggested bears almost exclusively on our
responsibility for our own horizon of previous experiences. But we are also
responsible for the ways in which we participate and shape social and
cultural mores. As such, we must become also more conscientious producers
of social and cultural mores, recognizing that our beliefs and actions are
never merely private, but always affect the social and cultural horizons in
which I (and others) operate. What is needed is not just a change in
personal affections, but also in the social imagination23 that partially
conditions and shapes my (and others’) affective responses.
It is not easy, then, to change our passive syntheses, but it is, I
would argue, possible. The process would be slow, and would require, not
just changing active judgments, but also a concerted effort to continually
bring to mind the way in which we are passively constituting the world,
and critiquing this passive constitution on the basis of its principles,
underlying motives, and affections. It would also require reinforcing these
changes in judgment with a change in notable affective force—I can’t just
think that the stereotype of the stoic and unfeeling man is dangerous, but
I must also regularly bring to mind examples where this is true, and watch
movies that valorize sensitive men rather than the unattached loner, and
otherwise make myself aware of the pain and sorrow caused by that
stereotype. Changing our affections towards things is not just done for
ourselves, but also for the social community that we transmit to future
generations. In this regard, what is needed, perhaps, is not just social
education—which tries to change people’s minds—but also a new social
imagination that helps shape people’s experiences and affections.
One possible application of this notion of social imagination
occurs in the complex issue of affirmative action. While this is no doubt a
larger issue than can be adequately dealt with here, I would like to point
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out the way that the notion of passive synthesis helps us make sense of
affirmative action as an attempt to re-inscribe the social imagination. That
is, given the role that past experiences play in how we make sense of our
world now, one possible justification for affirmative action is that there is a
social value to be gained from having persons of different ethnic and sexual
groups in various positions throughout society. This would be part of
trying to right previous historical imbalances—but not by way of some odd
numbers game, in which a certain percentage of people occupying a certain
position would somehow make up for centuries of oppression.24 Rather, it
would begin to right previous historical imbalances by beginning to foster
a new set of experiences (i.e., one in which we see people of those groups
in those societal positions) so that our passive syntheses regarding people of
those groups can start to be influenced by these new experiences, and not
just old ones. That is, the point of giving pride of place (all other things
being equal) to, for example, a woman in a philosophy graduate student
program25 is not that having X number of women in philosophy grad
programs somehow makes up for centuries of patriarchy. Rather, the idea
is that there is a social value (which tips the scales in this direction, all other
things being equal) in having women represented in an area they are not
currently widely represented in. This social value would be that the more
women that are encountered in philosophy (as writers, speakers, students
and teachers), the more philosophy becomes a normal and acceptable
avenue for women to pursue, the more women are seen as philosophical
and rational (rather than emotional and ‘flighty’), the more traditional
notions of femininity are adapted to include academic success, etc.
By applying the phenomenological language of passive synthesis
here, we are then able to reshape the discussion surrounding affirmative
action (for example) so that we see that it is not some silly numbers game,
but rather as one way (though not the only way) to begin to change the
social imaginary, both by adding new sedimentations to the ‘reservoir’ of
people’s experiences and by beginning to change the affective force
associated with certain meanings and experiences. Not only does this argue
against the ‘numbers game’ view of affirmative action, but it also argues
against the ‘reverse discrimination’ view,26 which understands affirmative
action as favoring minorities merely because they are minorities. Given the
impact of experience on the way we make sense of the world, passive
synthesis helps us understand that there is another factor, another level of
social value, to add to every evaluative process, namely, that of helping
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shape future horizons of past experiences by shaping the social imagination.
Hence, the mitigating factor in affirmative action is not that a particular
person is or is not a minority, but rather the extent to which they can help
shape the social imagination in desirable ways. This social value is something
else to be considered in reviewing applications, alongside educational
background, efficiency with which the candidate can carry out the required
task, relevant work history, etc. This is but one example of a way in which
the discourse of passive synthesis might be helpful in combating
oppression.27
I think that this brief sketch of an example suggests the possibility
of using the language of passive synthesis to help combat oppression. While
there is more work to be done on this topic, I hope what has been
accomplished here is enough to at least prove the merit of using the
phenomenological language of passive synthesis to discuss oppression.28
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Notes
I have in mind the notion of oppression discussed in the work of Marilyn Frye. For a
brief introduction to this understanding of oppression, cf. Frye 2003 and Bailey 2003.
2
This seems, to me, to be a central motivation for Bailey’s analysis of privilege: to show
people their personal complicity in oppressive structures; cf. Baily, 2003.
3
It is also helpful in this regard to distinguish between several types of responsibility,
especially if one wants to avoid making one’s audience defensive. At the very least, we can
distinguish: a) being called on to respond to something (i.e., my response-ability); b)
being responsible to someone for something; and c) blameworthiness. The vocabulary of
passive synthesis that will be discussed in this paper, I think helps us understand how
being responsible in the first sense can lead to a responsibility in the second sense (which
is sufficient to inspire action and/or change in us) without necessarily having to lead to
responsibility in the third sense. By showing us a responsibility that calls for change
without prescribing blame, I believe passive synthesis can remain ‘neutral’ enough to be
acceptable to those not predisposed towards agreeing with it, without thereby letting them
off the hook for change. I’d like to thank John Drummond for pointing out this
distinction in senses of responsibility to me.
4
I use “making sense” here in a somewhat technical manner that is distinct from
understanding. Understanding requires judgment, and active, theoretical engagement
with the world. Making sense, on the other hand, is the way in which we encounter the
world first and foremost as meaningful, as having a sense. Since, as I will argue below, this
sense comes about via acts of (passive) synthesis carried out by the subject, this sense is
1

94 Janus Head
not merely found in the world, nor merely created by me, but is in some sense both: it is
made by the subject, even as this making happens passively, automatically, and in response
to what gives itself in the world. Sense, then, is not merely objective (found in the world),
nor subjective (created by me), but phenomenological.
5
While other phenomenological figures (e.g., Merleau-Ponty) discuss themes of
sedimentation, habituation, and other related phenomena, I focus here primarily on
Husserl because his discourse is more individualistic than that of many later figures. As
such, Husserl provides more ‘common ground’ with the kind of individualistic moral
thinking that we are hoping to speak to, and therefore strikes me as providing a better
basis for a vocabulary that could speak to those people with whom we are concerned. I
hope to show that the more individualistic nature of the Husserlian discourse does not
prevent phenomenology from being able to account for societal structures and
institutions.
6
Also called at times by Husserl “prepredicative experience” or functioning subjectivity.
These refer to the same basic functions, if from different perspectives.
7
For more on these elements, cf. also Ryan 1977.
8
For this reason, it is not entirely proper to speak here of objects, as only the categorial
object is an object according to Husserl (Husserl 1985, 81 n.1). One can say though, as
Husserl does, that without affection “there would be no objects at all and no present
organized with objects” (Husserl 1973, 164).
9
The automatic naure of such acts of constitution is brought most noticeably to our
attention in those situations when the act of constitution is no longer able to happen
automatically. When I encounter a new design of chair, for example, if the new design is
sufficiently different from my previous experiences of chairs, I do not recognize it as such,
and so do not know what the thing in front of me is. Similarly, when I encounter familiar
objects in new contexts, I am unable to make sense of their new function, and so do not
use them automatically, but must determine their significance in this new context. The
first time I encountered carpet swatches on the ground in kindergarten, it was not
immediately obvious that these were to function as our ‘chairs,’ that this is where we were
supposed to sit during story time, because this was not a familiar use of carpet swatches to
me, nor was a carpet swatch a familiar example of a chair. I had to be instructed that the
swatches were to be used for this purpose before I could realize what I was supposed to do
with them.
10
One could be tempted to think that induction lies in the sphere of active synthesis,
given its use in scientific judgments. However, Husserl will contend that the scientific and
philosophico-logical use of induction is in fact founded on an earlier, experiential and
passive level of induction (Husserl 1954, 29), which is ubiquitous in all human practices
and experience (Husserl 1954, 51); cf. also Mohanty 1964, 142-143.
11
These “object-like formations” can then become the basis for later judgments and
(active) acts—but Husserl is adamant that it is only because of passive syntheses that the
ego is able to actively direct its regard (Husserl 1973, 120).
12
For more on the notion of an environing-world, cf. Steinbock 1995.
13
Cf. Levinas’ discussion of the “third,” for example in Levinas 1998b, 106-107.
14
Cf. Levinas 1986.
15
Cf. Levinas 1980, 114-15 and 124-125.
16
For a more detailed explanation of Levinas along these lines, cf. DeRoo 2013 and
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DeRoo 2010.
17
One must be careful to remember here that this similarity is “felt,” not objectively
present. That is, it is a similarity in how I associate with things, not similarities in the
things encountered. While there is, no doubt, a connection between objective structures
and my association to them, the significant aspect in passive synthesis is the felt similarity
(i.e., how I experience or intend the thing). It is, therefore, a similarity of
(phenomenological) sense or meaning.
18
This would be responsibility in the third sense discussed above (“blameworthiness”), in
a manner similar to that put forward by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics when he
claims that we are responsible for the habits that we currently have; cf., e.g., II.1.§ 8
(1103b25).
19
This, I would argue, is responsibility in the second sense given above: “being
responsible to someone for something.”
20
Cf., for example, Levinas 1995, 84-85.
21
The sense I have of maleness (and this would apply also for femaleness, though
obviously my personal experiences of that would be different) would be constructed from
a variety of experiences and affections that reside in my horizon of past experiences and
affections, including: a) my own experience as male (how others have treated me as a
male); b) discussions I have had about being male; c) discourses I have read and/or been a
part of concerning maleness; d) my affections of maleness, both in myself and in others;
and e) my experiences of other males. All of these would be affected in various ways by the
affective relationship I would have between the males I have experienced (including
myself ) and the masculinity I have read/heard/learned about, both academically and
otherwise.
22
This would be also hold true for people from marginalized groups. That is, it is not only
those in the oppressing groups, but also those in oppressed groups, who contribute to the
construction of the “bird cage” of oppression, at least in the lives of individual people. I
thank one of the anonymous reviewers from Janus Head for pointing this out to me.
Pursuing this issue further would be interesting, not only in its own right, but also as a
potential point of disagreement between phenomenological and structural accounts of
oppression. While I am trying to bring the two together in this paper, this topic could
potentially prove divisive (hopefully, fruitfully so). Though there will not be time to
pursue this topic further in this paper, I hope others will do so.
23
The literature on social imagination is too vast to be recounted here. In shorthand, let
me point to the work of Charles Taylor as one example of social imagination; cf. Taylor
2004 and Taylor 2007.
24
This notion of affirmative action as a “numbers game” is prevalent among many
political and social opponents of affirmative action. A mainstream (rather than academic)
example that clearly shows this is the article and the corresponding response section of
Cueva 2011. For a more academic exploration of the issue, specifically in terms of hiring
practices in police departments, cf. Levinson 1982.
25
I do not know whether such policies play any role in graduate program acceptance. I
use it here merely as a hypothetical example, not because I am claiming that it happens.
26
Also prevalent in Cueva 2011, especially in some of the responses.
27
There are, of course, several other factors that would have to come into play to evaluate
whether or not affirmative action is an affective policy in addressing societal inequalities,

96 Janus Head
and whether or not, overall, it does in fact combat rather than perpetuate oppression. I
am not contending that the factor I present here (the ability to shape the social
imagination) outweighs the others, just that it is another factor to be included in the
equation.
28
I would like to thank especially Noah Moss-Brender, David Koukal, Sara Heinämaa,
Kascha Snavely and John Drummond, as well as the participants of the 2010 Annual
Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association and of the 48th Annual Conference
of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) for feedback on
earlier versions of this paper.

